Boeing Stock Price Forecast - BA at $194 Faces a Triple Blow — $108 Oil, 69% of 777 Backlog in the Middle East

Boeing Stock (NYSE: BA) at $194 — The Triple Threat From Iran, a 737 MAX Wiring Issue and $25 Billion in Early-2030s FCF That Makes This the Most Compelling Decade Play in Aerospace

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$194 and Closing In on the $192 Intraday Low: The Numbers That Demand Attention

Boeing Company (NYSE: BA) is trading at $194.05–$194.08 on March 20, 2026, down 3.53%–3.54% on the day from a previous close of $201.18. The intraday range ran from $192.54 at the low to $201.99 at the high — a $9.45 spread that reflects both the macro pressure from the Iran war and the stock-specific weight of the deteriorating sentiment narrative. Market capitalization stands at $152.59–$158.10 billion depending on the exact trading moment. The forward P/E is 631.43 — a number that looks alarming until you understand that Boeing is in the middle of a multi-year production ramp where current earnings are intentionally depressed by front-loaded costs, and the relevant valuation metric is the path to $25 billion in annual free cash flow the company is building toward, not the trailing earnings that are still recovering from five years of operational crises. Revenue growth year-over-year is 34.50%. Short interest is 1.48%. There is no dividend.

The 52-week range from $128.88 to $254.35 tells the complete story of a stock that has been on a genuine recovery trajectory — BA was trading at $128 just 12 months ago — and is now being dragged back toward the lower end of its recovery range by three simultaneous pressures that, if they converge, represent the most serious threat to Boeing's near-term financial performance since the Alaska Airlines door plug incident.

Wall Street's consensus is Buy at 4.38. SA Analysts carry a Buy at 3.57. The Quant system rates it Hold at 3.14. That spread between the bullish Wall Street and fundamental analysts and the more cautious quant system reflects exactly the tension at the heart of the BA investment thesis right now — the long-term structural case is compelling, the near-term operational reality is complicated, and the geopolitical overlay from the Iran war is creating headline risk that is difficult to model.

The Three Blows Landing Simultaneously: Oil, Middle East Exposure and Supply Chain

Boeing (NYSE: BA) is facing three distinct but interconnected headwinds that are compressing the stock price toward $192–$194 despite a fundamental business recovery that is genuinely advancing. Understanding each of these pressures separately — and then understanding how they interact — is the only way to calibrate the risk-reward at current prices.

The first and largest blow is the macroeconomic softening that $100+ oil is generating globally. Brent crude above $108 and WTI above $95 are not merely numbers on a commodities screen — they are a tax on economic growth that flows directly into airline decision-making. When fuel prices are high, the value proposition of newer, more fuel-efficient aircraft strengthens. A Boeing 737 MAX is 15%–20% more fuel efficient per seat than the 737 NG it replaces. At $108 Brent, the annual fuel savings per aircraft over its operational life expand dramatically, which should be bullish for aircraft orders. But the mechanism breaks down when the same oil price that boosts aircraft economics simultaneously erodes the economic growth that drives passenger demand. Airlines canceling routes because they are no longer economically viable need fewer aircraft, not more. Consumers squeezed by both higher living costs and higher ticket prices fly less. Corporate travelers, who fill the premium cabins that generate the highest margin revenue for airlines, reduce discretionary international travel when their own companies are cutting costs in response to the macroeconomic uncertainty.

Bank of America has stated directly that avoiding a global recession requires the Strait of Hormuz to reopen within days, not weeks. The Strait has been effectively closed for 19 days. That statement from one of the world's largest financial institutions is not hyperbole — it is a specific quantitative assessment of the timeline for economic damage infliction. Every additional week of Hormuz closure narrows the window between "temporary disruption" and "structural demand recalibration" in the commercial aviation market. BA's commercial segment is the engine of its recovery thesis, and that engine is exposed to the macroeconomic cycle in a way that the defense segment is not.

The second blow is geographic and specific to the Boeing 777 and 787 programs. Middle Eastern carriers are not merely important customers — they are structurally critical to two of Boeing's most important commercial programs in a way that creates concentrated backlog risk that deserves quantification rather than hand-waving.

The Middle East Backlog Concentration: 69% of 777 Orders, 32% of 787 Orders

The numbers on Boeing's Middle East backlog exposure are striking enough that they need to be stated with precision. Middle Eastern carriers hold 419 of the 609 total Boeing 777 orders in the global backlog — a 69% concentration ratio. For the Boeing 787, Middle Eastern carriers account for 334 of the 1,058 total backlog orders — a 32% share. The Boeing 737 backlog is much better diversified at just 4% Middle Eastern exposure out of 4,861 total orders. The Boeing 767 shows four Middle Eastern orders from the 96-order global backlog, which are specifically the tanker aircraft for Israel rather than commercial passenger orders.

Total Middle Eastern exposure across all programs: 968 aircraft orders out of a total global backlog of 6,624 — approximately 15% of the entire Boeing commercial order book. If Turkey is included in the Middle East category, that share increases to approximately 18%. These are not speculative future orders — they are committed backlogs with customer deposits and purchase agreements that represent billions of dollars of revenue recognition scheduled over the next 5–10 years.

The commercial logic that built this exposure is straightforward. Gulf carriers — Emirates, Qatar Airways, Etihad, flydubai — transformed themselves into the world's most powerful international connector airlines by using their central geographic positioning and oil-funded expansion capital to build hub operations that route massive traffic volumes through Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. That hub model requires specifically wide-body aircraft — the Boeing 777X for ultra-long-range routes and the Boeing 787 for medium-to-long-range connectivity. The 737 MAX is largely irrelevant to these airlines' core strategy, which is why the 4% Middle East 737 exposure is so much lower than the 777 and 787 numbers.

The 777X program specifically is where the Middle East concentration risk becomes most acute. Boeing currently has more than 600 Boeing 777X orders in the backlog, with the program expected to enter service in 2027 at an initial rate of 5 aircraft per month. The production economics of the 777X — with post-discount pricing around $200 million per unit and expected 20% gross margins — generate approximately $2.4 billion in annual cash flow at the 5/month rate. But nearly 70% of the entire 777X order book is from Middle Eastern carriers whose growth trajectories, hub traffic volumes, and long-haul network economics are all directly threatened by the regional instability now unfolding around them. A scenario where Emirates defers 20 777X deliveries by two years — not cancels, just defers — would remove approximately $4 billion from Boeing's near-term revenue recognition schedule and require production rate adjustments with their own cost implications.

February Deliveries: 51 Aircraft, $3.3 Billion in Value, YTD 97 Deliveries

Boeing's (NYSE: BA) February delivery numbers showed sequential improvement from January's 46 aircraft to 51 in February — a 10.9% increase driven primarily by the 737 MAX program, which delivered 43 aircraft in February versus 37 in January. The wide-body picture was more mixed: Boeing delivered two 777F freighters and three 787-9s in February, alongside one Boeing 767-2C (the base configuration for the KC-46A tanker) and two Boeing 767-300F freighters. The total delivery value was $3.3 billion — stable sequentially despite the improved unit count, reflecting the less favorable mix where more 737 MAXes replaced higher-value 787 and 777 units.

Year-to-date through February, Boeing has delivered 97 airplanes valued at $6.6 billion, compared to 89 deliveries valued at $6.2 billion in the same period of the prior year. The 8-unit YTD increase and $400 million in additional value are being driven almost entirely by the 737 MAX program — evidence that the commercial ramp is proceeding but that it is 737-heavy rather than being balanced across the portfolio.

The book-to-bill ratio for February alone was 0.4x in terms of order count and 0.7x in terms of value — below 1.0x, meaning Boeing delivered more aircraft than it booked new orders during the month. However, this is not an alarming signal when viewed on a two-month basis: year-to-date through February, the book-to-bill was 1.3x in orders and 1.7x in value — healthy readings that indicate strong underlying demand with upward pressure on production from a demand perspective.

February Orders: 21 Gross Orders, 15 Net, Vietnam Airlines Identified for 60 737 MAXes

February order activity was significantly lighter than January's 107-order surge, coming in at 21 gross orders with 15 net orders valued at $2.1 billion. The composition: seven single-aisle aircraft and 14 wide-body aircraft including eight freighters. Air Astana ordered five Boeing 787-9s, two unidentified customers ordered three 787-9s, an unidentified customer ordered seven 737 MAXes, and an unidentified customer ordered six Boeing 767-2C aircraft.

On the identification side — where previously anonymous orders are assigned to specific customers — Vietnam Airlines was confirmed as the customer for 60 Boeing 737 MAX airplanes, a booking that significantly expanded the 737's Southeast Asian footprint. Shenzhen Airlines was identified for one 737 MAX. Southwest Airlines was confirmed for two 737 MAXes. Qatar Airways was identified for one Boeing 777F.

The engine selection announcements were notable for the scale of GE Aerospace's dominance on the 787 platform. United Airlines selected GE Aerospace (GE) engines for 33 Boeing 787-10s and 17 Boeing 787-9s — a 50-unit commitment that is one of the largest single engine selections of the month. Flydubai selected GE Aerospace for 30 Boeing 787-9s. Etihad Airways selected GE for six Boeing 787-10s. Hawaiian Airlines (ALK) selected GE for three Boeing 787-10s. Ethiopian Airlines selected GE for three 787-9s. The pattern is unmistakable — GE Aerospace is taking dominant share on the 787 platform over Rolls-Royce, which has its own separate competitive implications for the engine duopoly.

Comparing February year-over-year: the same month in 2025 generated just five net orders valued at $54.3 million. February 2026's 15 net orders at $2.1 billion represent a 38.8x increase in order value — extraordinary progress even if the absolute February 2026 number looks light relative to January's 107-order headline.

The ASC 606 adjustment category — orders where a purchase contract exists but additional criteria have not yet been met — increased by nine units for the 737 program in February. Total ASC 606 adjustments now cover 590 orders, representing 8.8% of the total backlog versus 8.6% in the prior month. This is not a cancellation list, but it does represent the portion of the backlog where the legal and commercial criteria for full backlog recognition have not been completely satisfied. As that percentage creeps upward, it warrants monitoring.

The 737 MAX Wiring Issue: Q1 Delivery Impact, No Full-Year Consequence — Yet

The wiring issue on the Boeing 737 MAX program is the operational setback that competes for attention with the geopolitical headlines in driving BA stock toward $194. Boeing discovered a wiring defect during the ramp phase that requires physical inspection and remediation on aircraft in production. The company's guidance is that Q1 2026 delivery numbers will be impacted — meaning some of the 43/month run rate that February demonstrated will slip into Q2 — but there is no expected full-year consequence.

That guidance — Q1 impact, no full-year impact — is the correct framing if the issue is what management says it is: a detection-and-fix scenario where the quality control system identified a problem before aircraft reached customers, which is precisely how the quality assurance process is supposed to work. The fact that it was caught internally rather than in service is genuinely positive from a safety and reputational standpoint.

But Boeing's history creates a credibility problem with this framing that the stock price is appropriately discounting. The MCAS software issue that caused two fatal 737 MAX crashes was not fully understood on first investigation — it was only after the second crash that the fundamental design flaw became apparent. The Alaska Airlines door plug incident in January 2024 came after Boeing had repeatedly stated it had resolved its quality issues. Each time Boeing has said "we've addressed the problem" and then encountered a new problem, the market has rationally reduced its confidence in Boeing's ability to deliver on guidance timelines. The wiring issue is not in the same severity category as MCAS or the door plug, but it is occurring at precisely the moment when Boeing needs to demonstrate six consecutive months of clean operational execution to rebuild market trust in the ramp narrative.

Boeing is adding a fourth assembly line in Everett as it moves from 38 to 42 737s per month — a 15% production increase over 18 months. The long-term target remains 63 aircraft per month, and at Moody's estimated $12–$15 million in operating cash flow per jet, the 63/month target implies approximately $9–$11 billion in annual cash flow from the 737 program alone. That math is straightforward and compellingly attractive — but it requires clean execution to materialize, and every quality issue that delays the ramp timeline costs real cash that the market is already discounting in the forward P/E of 631.43.

$2.7 Billion Patriot Interceptor Contract and the F47: Defense Is Delivering

The defense segment at Boeing (NYSE: BA) is performing in ways that the commercial narrative has been overshadowing. The Iran war has demonstrated the value of Boeing's missile defense and interception technology in a live operational theater, and the market consequences are already materializing in contract awards.

Boeing makes the advanced radar for the PAC-3 missile within the Patriot Defense System — one of the most widely deployed advanced air defense platforms in the world. Each PAC-3 missile costs $4 million, and the system has demonstrated substantial operational effectiveness in the current conflict. Boeing has been awarded a $2.7 billion contract to accelerate interceptor production in direct response to the conflict — a contract that reflects both proven battlefield performance and anticipated demand for the next several years as the proliferation of low-cost attack munitions creates global demand for low-cost interception technology. Boeing's collaboration with Anduril on that interceptor platform positions it for the next generation of counter-drone and counter-munition systems, where the volume economics are fundamentally different from traditional high-cost missile systems.

The F47 contract — where Boeing defeated Lockheed Martin for what could be worth tens of billions of dollars in fighter jet production — is the defense segment's crown jewel win. The F-15EX contract, also worth potentially tens of billions, joins the F47 in the fighter division. The KC-46 tanker continues in production with potential for dozens more units. The $4.7 billion Apache helicopter export contract — which comes at higher margins than domestic orders — adds to the picture. Boeing's defense segment has seen double-digit year-over-year revenue growth, and management has explicitly stated they see no major charges coming in the defense segment right now. The goal is to grow defense operating margins toward 8%–9%, which against an expected $30 billion in annual defense revenue would generate approximately $2.7 billion in annual cash flow.

The Iran war-driven demand for Patriot missiles and interceptor technology is not a short-term spike — it is a sustained multi-year demand signal that will drive production contracts for years after the conflict concludes. Every conflict that validates the effectiveness of proven missile defense technology — and the current war is doing exactly that — drives allied nations to expand their own procurement programs. That procurement cycle benefits Boeing's defense segment in a way that compounds over a 3–5 year horizon regardless of what happens to commercial aviation demand.

Boeing Global Services: The Reliably Profitable $5.2 Billion Quarterly Revenue Engine

Boeing Global Services is the segment that gets the least headlines and generates the most reliable cash flow. In the most recent quarter, the segment delivered $5.2 billion in revenue with approximately 20% operating margins — implying approximately $1 billion in quarterly cash flow or $4 billion annualized. The segment's backlog is at record levels, driven by the growing installed base of Boeing commercial and defense aircraft that require ongoing maintenance, parts supply, training, and digital services.

The Digital Aviation Solutions gain-on-sale temporarily inflated the segment's reported operating margin, but stripping that out, the underlying 20% margin is the clean ongoing run rate. Forecasting growth in line with newly delivered aircraft volumes — as the ramp to 42+ aircraft per month and eventually 63 per month adds to the installed fleet — would put segment profits at approximately $1.5 billion annually by 2030. Services businesses attached to installed product bases are among the most defensively profitable in industrial history, and Boeing's services segment represents that archetype at aerospace scale.

The 787 Cash Cow: 8 Per Month Now, 16 Per Month as the Long-Term Target

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is currently producing approximately 8 aircraft per month with a plan to reach 10 by year-end 2026. The long-term target under active study is 16 aircraft per month. At a post-discount sales price of approximately $125 million per unit and a 20% gross margin, the 787 program at 16 per month generates approximately $4.8 billion in annual cash flow. That figure — compared to near-zero cash generation from the 787 program during the 2021–2023 delivery halt period — represents one of the most dramatic cash flow inflection stories in industrial history.

The complicating factor is that 334 of the 1,058 total 787 backlog orders — or 32% — come from Middle Eastern carriers. If the 787 program attempts to ramp from 10 to 16 per month over the next three years, approximately 3–5 of those additional monthly slots will need to be filled by Middle Eastern customers taking delivery on schedule. If those customers begin requesting delivery deferrals due to regional economic deterioration or hub traffic erosion, Boeing faces a capacity allocation problem: it will have built the production infrastructure for 16/month but have customers who are not yet ready to absorb the volume. That is not a hypothetical — it is the specific mechanism through which the Middle East regional risk translates into Boeing's financial model.

The Boeing 787 backlog currently provides support for production rates of 15–18 airplanes per month in terms of total contracted volume, with approximately 4.5–5.5 units of monthly support coming from Middle Eastern carriers. The support from non-Middle Eastern carriers is therefore approximately 10–12.5 aircraft per month, which is comfortably above the current 8/month rate but not sufficient on its own to justify a full 16/month rate without Middle Eastern delivery absorption.

The Supply Chain's Middle East Exposure: 11 Airport Hubs, 10 MRO Providers, 10 Direct Suppliers

Boeing took the proactive step of asking its supplier base to verify Middle East exposure — a supply chain governance action that is both reassuring (Boeing is aware of the risks) and concerning (the risks are significant enough that Boeing felt compelled to audit them). The analysis of Boeing's supplier exposure identified more than 30 companies and parties, including 11 airport and logistics hubs in the Middle East, 10 MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) providers, and 10 supply chain companies.

At the Tier 1 direct supplier level — companies delivering directly to Boeing's factories — the exposure is specific and concentrated in the 777 and 787 programs. Strata Manufacturing in the UAE provides composite aerostructures for the Boeing 777 and 787. Elbit Systems Ltd. (ESLT) in Israel provides door and floor beams for the Boeing 787 and Boeing 777. Israel Aerospace Industries supplies structural components for the Boeing 777 and 787. Turkish Aerospace Industries provides elevator and other components for the Boeing 787 and 737 MAX.

Tier 2 and 3 suppliers include Emirates Precision Industries for machined metal parts, TEI for manufacturing components for the CFM LEAP, GEnx, and GE9X aero engines, Kale Aerospace for structural subassemblies, TCI Aircraft Interiors for Boeing 737 galleys, and Turkish Seat Industries for passenger seats. Most of the Turkish suppliers are outside the active conflict zone, but Turkey's geographic proximity to the Middle East creates logistics routing complications and potential insurance premium increases for cargo movement.

The Strata and Israeli Tier 1 suppliers represent the most acute near-term risk within the supply chain. Israel is not just geographically close to the conflict — it is an active participant, with Israeli strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure being one of the primary triggers for the current oil price surge. Any escalation that disrupts Israeli industrial operations, or that requires Strata in the UAE to reduce production due to regional security concerns, would directly impact 777 and 787 production at Boeing's Everett facility. The base case remains that these disruptions do not occur — the supply chain is resilient and Boeing's assessment is that no major assembly disruption is the central scenario. But the tail risk is real, and Tier 1 supplier disruption on the 777/787 platform would be measured in weeks of production impact, not days.

The Commercial Ramp Numbers That Make the Decade Case Compelling

The long-term cash flow math for Boeing is the reason why multiple analysts maintain Buy ratings despite the near-term operational and geopolitical noise. Running through the full production target scenario with specific numbers:

The 737 MAX at 63 aircraft per month generates approximately $10 billion in annual cash flow at $12–$15 million per unit. The 787 at 16 aircraft per month generates approximately $4.8 billion at $125 million post-discount pricing with 20% gross margins. The 777X at 5 aircraft per month generates approximately $2.4 billion at $200 million post-discount pricing with 20% gross margins. The commercial total at full production targets: approximately $17.2 billion in annual cash flow.

The defense segment at $30 billion in annual revenue targeting 8%–9% operating margins contributes approximately $2.7 billion in annual cash flow. The services segment at $30 billion in annual revenue with 20% margins contributes approximately $6 billion in annual cash flow. Total across all segments: more than $25 billion in annual cash flow — a figure that Boeing's management believes is achievable in the early 2030s.

Against a current market capitalization of $152–$158 billion, a company generating $25 billion in annual free cash flow in the early 2030s represents a price-to-FCF multiple of approximately 6x on a forward 7-year basis. That is not an aggressive valuation for a duopoly manufacturer with a 6,624-aircraft commercial backlog, a proven defense portfolio, and a services business at record backlog levels. It is the kind of valuation that historically generates substantial returns for those who can tolerate the execution risk and the 7–10 year wait for the full thesis to materialize.

The 11,000 FCF estimate for 2028 that is referenced as an intermediate milestone is consistent with the ramp trajectory: the 737 at 42/month generating approximately $6–$7 billion, the 787 at 10–12/month generating approximately $3 billion, the 777X just entering production contributing marginally, defense at $2+ billion, and services at $4+ billion. That intermediate case represents a P/FCF of approximately 14–15x at current prices — still reasonable for the industrial franchise being described.

The 777X First Production Flight and FAA Certification Progress

The FAA cleared Boeing to advance 777-9 certification testing to its next phase — a regulatory milestone that, while incremental, confirms that the most difficult wide-body program in Boeing's history is moving forward rather than backward. The first flight of a production variant is expected in the coming weeks, a milestone that has triggered major accounting charges in prior periods when it was delayed and will be a positive catalyst for the stock when it finally occurs.

The 777X entering service in 2027 at 5 aircraft per month represents the final piece of the commercial portfolio completing its recovery. The 777X has been the program that most severely tested Boeing's ability to manage a complex new-generation aircraft development program. Spirit AeroSystems integration — Boeing brought Spirit back in-house after the door plug incident — is adding near-term costs but eliminates a major supply chain risk that previously contributed to quality control lapses. Management has delayed commercial margin recovery guidance specifically because Spirit integration costs are higher than initially anticipated, but the strategic rationale for the integration is sound over a multi-year horizon.

The Recession Warning and Why Hormuz Reopening Is the Single Biggest BA Catalyst

Bank of America's statement — that a global recession can only be avoided if the Strait of Hormuz reopens within days, not weeks — is the most important macro statement in Boeing's investment context right now. The connection is direct: a global recession reduces airline passenger traffic, which reduces airline revenues, which causes airlines to defer or cancel aircraft orders, which directly reduces Boeing's delivery schedule and cash flow generation. The global airline fleet is expected to grow from over 27,000 aircraft to nearly 50,000 over a 20-year period — but that growth trajectory assumes global GDP continues expanding at historical rates. A recession would compress the growth portion of aircraft demand, which accounts for more than 50% of the total delivery outlook, while simultaneously extending the retirement timing of older aircraft that airlines would otherwise have replaced.

The structural replacement demand — governed by maintenance costs and life-limited parts rather than economic growth — is more resilient but not immune. Airlines facing revenue pressure will extend the operational life of paid-off older aircraft rather than taking on the capital commitment of new aircraft deliveries. The Boeing 737 Classic, which the MAX was intended to replace, has extended economic life potential that airlines will exploit in a recessionary environment. That is not a catastrophic scenario for Boeing — the backlog is deep enough to sustain production through a 2–3 year downturn — but it would slow the delivery ramp and extend the timeline to the $25 billion FCF target.

The Verdict on Boeing (NYSE: BA): BUY for Long-Term Positions, HOLD Through the Near-Term Noise at $194

Boeing (NYSE: BA) at $194.05 is a BUY for 12–18 month horizons and beyond, with the acknowledgment that the next 60–90 days carry above-average execution risk from three converging pressures. The triple-blow scenario — macroeconomic softening from $108 oil, Middle East backlog concentration at 69% of 777 and 32% of 787 orders, and supply chain logistics friction from the conflict zone — is real, quantifiable, and currently being priced into the stock. What the $194 price does not adequately reflect is the $25 billion in early-2030s annual cash flow that is the destination of the commercial ramp, the defense contract wins including the F47 and the $2.7 billion interceptor award, and the services segment's record backlog generating $1 billion per quarter at 20% margins.

The 52-week range low of $128.88 established the absolute floor of market pessimism about Boeing's recovery trajectory. The stock is currently 50.5% above that floor while also 23.6% below the 52-week high of $254.35. The path from $128 to $254 was a genuine recovery story that the market rewarded. The pullback from $254 to $194 is a geopolitical risk discount superimposed on top of a recovery story that has not fundamentally changed in its multi-year direction.

The near-term risk is a break below $192 — the intraday low of the current session — which would likely accelerate selling toward $185 if macro conditions deteriorate further and Hormuz remains closed through April. The medium-term support is the $180–$185 zone where the stock found buyers during the Spirit AeroSystems integration announcement. The upside target if Hormuz reopens in the next two to four weeks is a return toward $210–$220 as the geopolitical risk premium unwinds and the underlying commercial ramp story reasserts itself.

Position sizing should reflect the binary character of the Hormuz situation — a rapid diplomatic resolution is a material upside catalyst, while continued closure through April increases recession probability and would justify further downside toward $180. The long-term thesis targeting $25 billion in FCF against a $152 billion market cap is a 6x FCF scenario in the early 2030s that is among the most compelling risk-reward setups in the entire industrial sector. BUY on pullbacks toward $185–$192 with a stop below $175 on a weekly close and a 12-month target of $230–$250 contingent on Hormuz reopening and clean Q2 delivery execution.

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