ROLR at $5.28 Is a Federal License and a $25M Promo Against a Rival Running $10B a Week — August 11 Is the First Real Look

ROLR at $5.28 Is a Federal License and a $25M Promo Against a Rival Running $10B a Week — August 11 Is the First Real Look

High Roller gained NFA membership and guaranteed introducing broker status on June 26 under a Crypto.com clearing pact | That's TradingNEWS

Itai Smidt 7/17/2026 12:24:17 PM

Key Points

  • ROLR trades near $5.28 with a $57.92 million market cap against a 52-week range of $1.16 to $33.68.
  • Q1 net revenues fell 35% to $3.4 million while adjusted EBITDA improved to negative $1.3 million from negative $3.0 million.
  • The company priced $25 million at $13.21 per share in January, leaving that placement 60% underwater.

High Roller Technologies trades near $5.28, having opened $5.25 and traded a $5.15 to $5.50 band on 103,940 shares against an average volume of 676,240. Market capitalization is $57.92 million across 10.97 million shares outstanding. The company employs 57 people. The 52-week high is $33.68. The 52-week low is $1.16.

That is a micro-cap with a $33.68-to-$1.16 range — a 29-fold spread inside twelve months — currently sitting 84.3% below the top and 355% above the bottom.

The thesis is that ROLR has stopped being an online casino and become a regulatory option on prediction markets. First-quarter net revenues were $3.4 million, down 35% from $5.2 million a year earlier, and management described that decline as deliberate — the result of exiting certain markets and heavily reducing customer acquisition spend in the online casino vertical. The company is not defending the legacy business. It is harvesting it to fund a pivot.

The pivot target is a category the company cites as growing nearly fourfold to $64 billion in trading volume in 2025, on pace to exceed $325 billion in 2026, and potentially topping $1.1 trillion by 2030. A $57.92 million company chasing a $325 billion volume pool is not a valuation argument. It is a lottery ticket, and it is priced as one.

What separates ROLR from the dozens of shells that announce prediction market pivots is that it did the regulatory work. Its U.S. unit gained National Futures Association membership and registered as a guaranteed introducing broker on June 26 under a clearing arrangement with Crypto.com's derivatives arm. That is a real license, granted by a real regulator, and it is the scarcest asset on this balance sheet.

The problem is the wall. The category leader did $31 billion of notional volume in June alone, up more than 70% from May, and was reportedly seeking funding at a $40 billion valuation — 690 times ROLR's entire market capitalization.

The August 11 print is the first look at whether any of this converts.

Down 84.3% From the High, Up 355% From the Low

The chart is the most volatile thing in the gaming complex and the numbers deserve stating plainly.

The 52-week high is $33.68. The 52-week low is $1.16. Spot at $5.28 sits 84.3% below the high and 355.2% above the low. That is a stock that has been priced as a going-concern risk and as a category disruptor inside the same twelve months, with a 29-fold spread between the two verdicts.

The recent tape is no calmer. On July 2 the stock closed $6.01, down 0.99% from $6.07, after fluctuating 6.20% between a $5.81 low and a $6.17 high in a single session. Two weeks later it trades $5.28 — a 12.1% decline — with today's range running $5.15 to $5.50, a 6.8% intraday swing on 103,940 shares.

That last number is the one that matters most and nobody discusses it. Session volume of 103,940 against an average of 676,240 means the stock is trading at 15.4% of its normal turnover. A micro-cap with a $57.92 million market cap moving 6.8% intraday on 15% of average volume is not being priced by a market. It is being priced by whoever happens to show up.

The performance context is brutal. Shares declined 27.6% in the stretch following the first-quarter report against a 0.1% return for the broad index, and slumped 31.8% over the trailing month while the index advanced 5%. That is not a sector move — the peer set is holding up fine, with the regional operators and the platform names trading in normal ranges.

The technical read reflects the indecision. The stock holds several positive signals but not enough for a buy candidate, and the conclusion was downgraded from buy to hold on small weaknesses in the technical picture. The modeled fair opening price for July 6 was $6.00. It has not seen it.

For a stock with a $32.52 twelve-month range, technical analysis is close to meaningless. This name does not trend. It gaps on headlines and drifts in between, and every headline for six months has been about prediction markets rather than about casino revenue.

The January Raise at $13.21 Is 60% Underwater

The capital markets history is the cleanest measure of how much value this pivot has destroyed on the way to creating optionality.

On January 19, the company priced a registered direct offering of 1,892,506 shares at $13.21 per share for approximately $25 million in gross proceeds before placement agent fees and expenses. The offering closed January 21. Stated use of proceeds: sales and marketing, geographic expansion, product development and diversification, working capital and general corporate purposes.

The stock trades $5.28. That is a 60.0% decline from the offering price in under six months, and the investors who funded the pivot are sitting on a $15 million paper loss against a $25 million commitment.

The dilution math is severe on a base this small. 1,892,506 shares issued against 10.97 million outstanding today means that single raise represents 17.3% of the current share count. A company with 10.97 million shares has almost no float to absorb issuance, and every subsequent raise compounds against a smaller and smaller denominator.

The context makes it worse. The raise landed five days after the January 14 announcement that the company was partnering with Crypto.com to enter the prediction markets space — the deal that started the entire re-rating. The $13.21 print was the market pricing the announcement. Everything since has been the market pricing the execution.

The capital did buy something real. The company regained compliance with NYSE American continued listing standards, resolving a prior deficiency under Section 1003(a)(ii) related to stockholders' equity after demonstrating compliance for two consecutive quarters. That is not a footnote — a listing deficiency on stockholders' equity means the company was at genuine risk of delisting, and the January raise is what fixed it. Management described the quarter as transformative specifically because it significantly strengthened the balance sheet.

A company that was fighting a listing deficiency in the fourth quarter, raised $25 million at $13.21 in January, and trades $5.28 in July has a solvency answer and a valuation problem. Those are different things, and the first one is the one that matters at a $57.92 million market cap.

The next capital event is the question nobody is asking.

Q1: $3.4 Million of Revenue and a Deliberate 35% Decline

The first-quarter numbers are small, and the way they are small is the whole strategic story.

Net revenues were $3.4 million, a decrease of $1.8 million or 35% against $5.2 million in the prior-year quarter. Net loss from continuing operations improved to $3 million, or 29 cents per share, from $3.7 million, or 44 cents per share, a year earlier. The net gaming revenue decline was led by lower activity across key geographies.

Management's framing is explicit and it is worth taking at face value. The revenue decline reflected a deliberate exit from certain markets and heavily reduced customer acquisition spend in the online casino vertical. During the quarter, the company continued to reshape itself around a more focused, better-capitalized, high-upside growth strategy while bringing operating discipline to the underlying business. Lower operating expenses contributed to improved year-over-year adjusted EBITDA while strategic capital allocations increased.

Translated: the company stopped buying casino customers and started spending on prediction markets.

That is a defensible decision and it is also an irreversible one. Online casino customer acquisition is a flywheel — you spend, you acquire, they deposit, they churn, you spend again. Stopping the spend does not pause the flywheel. It reverses it, and the installed base decays at whatever the natural churn rate is. A 35% year-over-year revenue decline in one quarter is what that decay looks like from a standing start.

The asset base underneath is genuine. The company operates HighRoller.com and Fruta.com, offering a portfolio of over 6,000 premium online casino games from more than 90 leading game providers across various jurisdictions worldwide, with a focus on Europe. It also provides internet-related advertising services. The founders started the business on December 21, 2021, and it is headquartered in Las Vegas.

Annualize $3.4 million and the run rate is $13.6 million against a $57.92 million market cap — 4.26 times sales on a revenue line that is shrinking 35% a year by design.

Nobody is paying 4.26 times sales for a declining European iCasino. They are paying for the ROLR brand and the NFA license, and the casino is the funding mechanism.

The EBITDA Line Is the Only Thing Working

The operating leverage story is real and it is the strongest number in the release.

Adjusted EBITDA improved $1.7 million to negative $1.3 million, or $(0.12) per common share, from negative $3.0 million, or $(0.36) per common share, in the first quarter of 2025. The adjusted EBITDA margin improved to negative 38% from negative 57%.

Run that arithmetic. Revenue fell $1.8 million. EBITDA improved $1.7 million. The company cut its losses by almost exactly the amount of revenue it shed, which means the marginal revenue it walked away from was carrying negative contribution margin. Those were customers acquired at a cost the lifetime value never recovered — the classic online casino trap — and exiting them was accretive.

That is the case for management. Discipline arrived, and it arrived fast enough to show up in a single quarter.

The margin line puts it in proportion. Negative 38% on $3.4 million of revenue is a $1.3 million quarterly cash burn. Against a $25 million raise closed in January, that is roughly nineteen quarters of runway at the current rate — nearly five years — before any prediction markets spend.

The prediction markets spend is the variable that eats it. The company committed to a $25 million free-to-trade prediction challenge announced June 4, designed to launch the ROLR brand ahead of the official product release. That number is the entire January raise, expressed as a customer acquisition campaign, and it lands before a single dollar of prediction revenue is booked.

The per-share figures are the ones to watch. Adjusted EBITDA of $(0.12) per share against 10.97 million shares outstanding is a tiny absolute loss. A $57.92 million company burning $1.3 million a quarter is not a solvency story. It is a story about whether the burn buys anything.

Trailing earnings per share reads $0.28 with a price-to-earnings ratio of 18.79 — a figure that sits awkwardly against a $3 million quarterly loss from continuing operations and reflects items below the operating line rather than the underlying business.

The operating business loses money. The EBITDA trajectory says less of it every quarter. That is the honest read.

The NFA License Is the Real Asset

Strip out the brands, the games, the domains, and the European footprint, and one item on this balance sheet is genuinely scarce.

On June 26, the company's U.S. unit gained National Futures Association membership and registration as a guaranteed introducing broker under a futures commission merchant arrangement with Crypto.com. That license was awarded by the NFA, and it is what allows the company to legally solicit and accept orders for event contracts in the United States.

That matters because the regulatory pathway into prediction markets is not open to anyone with a website. Event contracts are derivatives. They clear through a designated contract market and settle through a futures commission merchant, and the entity touching the customer has to be registered. A guaranteed introducing broker registration means the company can front-end the customer relationship while the FCM carries the capital requirement and the clearing obligation.

The strategic implication is that ROLR does not have to become an exchange. It has to become a distribution channel into one, and that is a fundamentally cheaper business to build. The company plans to act initially as a guaranteed introducing broker while developing a mobile-based technology platform through which users can access prediction contracts.

The political tailwind is real and it is federal. The president posted publicly that the CFTC's exclusive authority over prediction markets must be maintained. If that holds, the entire category operates under one regulator rather than fifty, and a small operator with an NFA registration has the same regulatory standing as a large one. That is the opposite of the online sports betting model, where more than two dozen state licenses in some markets create a cost moat the incumbents spent a decade digging.

The company built the surrounding apparatus quickly. It secured a definitive agreement with Crypto.com's derivatives arm, established ROLR as its consumer-facing prediction market brand, acquired ROLR.com as the digital destination, engaged a Big 4 licensing advisor, and appointed a head of applied artificial intelligence to oversee compliance automation, personalization and customer engagement.

Compliance automation is the tell. A 57-person company entering a regulated derivatives category cannot staff a compliance department. It has to build one in software.

The Crypto.com Relationship Is the Whole Strategy

Everything ROLR is attempting runs through a single counterparty, and that concentration is both the enabler and the risk.

The company partnered with Crypto.com to enter the prediction markets space on January 14, secured a definitive agreement with Crypto.com's Derivatives North America unit, and now operates its NFA registration as a guaranteed introducing broker under that FCM pact. CDNA is the designated contract market and the clearing infrastructure. ROLR is the front end.

That structure is elegant. The hard, expensive, capital-intensive part of a prediction market — the exchange license, the clearing house, the margin system, the regulatory relationship at the DCM level — belongs to someone else. ROLR builds an app, acquires customers, and routes flow. It is asset-light by design, which is the only way a company with $57.92 million of market capitalization and 57 employees enters a derivatives category at all.

It is also complete dependency. If the relationship changes, the strategy has no substrate. A guaranteed introducing broker is guaranteed by its FCM — that is what the designation means — and the FCM carries the obligations. ROLR does not have an alternative clearing relationship, and building one would require starting the regulatory process over.

The counterparty itself is having a good week. Citadel Securities invested $400 million in Crypto.com on Thursday, valuing the exchange at $20 billion. That is a validation of the platform ROLR is building on top of, and it is a $20 billion counterparty against a $57.92 million introducing broker. The power asymmetry is total.

The surrounding partnerships are real but thin. Marketing and customer acquisition agreements with Lines.com, Forever Network and Leverage Game Media. A Web-3 engagement partnership with Power Protocol announced January 15. A strategic investment from Saratoga Casino Holdings on January 9. Addition to the Russell Microcap Index on June 29, which brings passive flow at the smallest scale the index complex offers.

None of those move revenue. They are the scaffolding a micro-cap builds to demonstrate it is serious, and the serious part is the NFA registration.

$25 Million of Free-to-Trade Is the Customer Acquisition Bill

The June 4 announcement is the number that determines whether this works, and it is the entire January raise.

The company announced it would launch the ROLR brand with a $25 million free-to-trade prediction challenge ahead of the official prediction markets product release. That is a promotional campaign sized at exactly the gross proceeds of the January offering, deployed to acquire users before the product monetizes.

The logic is the standard playbook and it is not wrong. Prediction markets are a two-sided venue — liquidity attracts liquidity, and the first mover in any given contract owns the spread. A free-to-trade challenge builds a user base and seeds volume without charging for either. It is the same move the sportsbooks ran in 2019 and 2020, and it worked.

The problem is the comparison set. The category leader is running roughly $10 billion in weekly notional volume, crossed $100 billion in lifetime notional on June 15, recorded its first billion-dollar single trading days, and posted a record $6.38 billion in weekly notional during the World Cup, up 43% week over week. It did $31 billion of notional in June alone, up more than 70% from May, with sports contracts making up about 85% of activity. It accounted for 38% of the combined daily audience across the six major betting apps in June, against roughly 6% a year earlier for it and its nearest rival combined.

Twenty-five million dollars of free trading against a competitor processing $10 billion a week is not a customer acquisition campaign. It is a rounding error deployed against a network effect that is already compounding.

The counter is that ROLR does not need to win. It needs a sliver. The category is projected to exceed $325 billion in volume this year. Capture one-tenth of one percent — $325 million of volume — at a 3% take rate and that is $9.75 million of revenue against a $13.6 million annualized base. That single decimal point adds 72% to the top line.

That is the actual bull case and it is coherent. At a $57.92 million market cap, ROLR does not need to beat anyone. It needs to exist inside a category growing fourfold.

The Category Math: $64 Billion to $325 Billion to $1.1 Trillion

The addressable market framing the company uses is the entire investment case, and it is worth interrogating rather than accepting.

The cited third-party estimate has prediction market trading volumes growing nearly fourfold to $64 billion in 2025, on pace to exceed $325 billion in 2026, and potentially exceeding $1.1 trillion by 2030. That is a 408% growth rate in the current year and a 17-fold expansion across five years.

The 2026 figure is already being validated by the tape. The category leader alone did $31 billion in June. Annualize that single venue at the June run rate and it clears $372 billion — above the entire category estimate for the year — and the second-largest venue accounted for 13% of the daily audience on top of it. Prediction markets processed more than $50 billion in volume as the World Cup kicked off. The estimate is not aggressive. It may be low.

The demand shift is structural rather than promotional. The two prediction venues captured 78.5% of betting app installs across the six major platforms through June, against roughly 6% of the audience a year earlier. During the June 1 to 15 opening stretch of the tournament, the leader took 42.3% of new installs and the second venue took 31.2%. Female users on the leading exchange grew 106% during the tournament, more than double the 54% growth among male users.

That is a category breaking out of a niche demographic into a general one, which is the precondition for the $1.1 trillion number.

The reason the growth is happening is a product argument, and it cuts in ROLR's favor. Prediction markets offer better odds, bigger position sizes, and more contract variety than a sportsbook, because an exchange charges a spread rather than a hold. The structural hold is lower, price transparency is higher, and users are voting with their fingertips.

The reason it is dangerous for ROLR is the same argument. Lower structural hold means the revenue per dollar of volume is thin, and thin revenue requires enormous scale. A 3% take rate on prediction volume compares to a 7.1% net win margin on a sportsbook. The unit economics only work at size, and ROLR has no size.

The market is real. The question is whether a $57.92 million company gets a seat.

Kalshi at $40 Billion Is the Wall

The competitive position needs to be stated without euphemism because it is the reason this stock trades at $5.28 rather than $33.68.

The category leader was reportedly seeking funding at a $40 billion valuation last month, up from $22 billion in May — an 81.8% step-up in roughly 30 days. That is 690 times ROLR's $57.92 million market capitalization. It runs roughly $10 billion in weekly notional. It has surpassed $100 billion in cumulative volume. Its mobile app downloads topped three million in a single month for the first time, and it recorded 3.76 million downloads in the fourth quarter of 2025, exceeding both major sportsbooks individually.

Against that, ROLR has an NFA registration granted three weeks ago, a brand with no users, a domain, and a $25 million promotional budget.

The incumbents are not the only problem. DraftKings — a $12.17 billion company with $6.29 billion of trailing revenue, 28 state licenses, and an existing user base — launched its own proprietary prediction markets exchange and integrated it directly into an app that millions of people already have installed. If the largest sportsbook in America is entering this category as a challenger, a 57-person micro-cap is not entering it as a peer.

The honest version of the ROLR bull case does not involve winning. It involves the category growing fast enough that even the fourth or fifth distribution channel generates meaningful revenue on a $57.92 million base. The company is not trying to build an exchange. It is trying to be a front end, and front ends can be niche — a poker-focused audience, a specific European cohort, a particular contract vertical — while the exchange economics happen elsewhere.

That is a real business. It is worth somewhere between zero and $200 million depending entirely on execution, and the market is pricing $57.92 million.

The one asymmetry worth naming: the same third-party estimate that says $325 billion this year says $1.1 trillion by 2030. A market that large supports more than two venues. The question is whether ROLR survives long enough to be one of the survivors, and $1.3 million of quarterly burn against $25 million raised says it has the runway to try.

The Regulatory Tape Cuts Both Ways

The legal environment is the variable that determines whether the NFA license is a moat or a receipt, and it is moving in two directions at once.

The federal direction is favorable. The president publicly stated that the CFTC's exclusive authority over prediction markets must be maintained. If federal preemption holds, ROLR's NFA registration and guaranteed introducing broker status is a national license, and the state-by-state licensing regime that costs the sportsbooks tens of millions annually becomes irrelevant to this category. A micro-cap with one federal registration competes on the same regulatory footing as a $40 billion exchange.

The state direction is hostile and it is producing results. A Michigan judge temporarily blocked the leading exchange from offering sports contracts in the state on June 30 and ordered it to add geolocation controls — the second state to secure a court order. The same day, the exchange sued Ohio regulators over a $5 million sports prediction market fine, arguing the state's no-jury administrative penalty process violates the Ohio Constitution. New Jersey filed the first Supreme Court petition in the fight on July 2, seeking more time to challenge the exchange's Third Circuit win over state gambling regulators. The two largest prediction venues joined forces on July 3 to fight a Minnesota betting ban.

That is four states in active litigation against the category ROLR just bought a ticket into.

The asymmetry favors the small operator in an odd way. Every dollar the incumbents spend litigating state challenges is a dollar ROLR does not have to spend, because the precedent applies to everyone. The leader is doing the legal work for the industry, funded by a $40 billion valuation, and ROLR gets the outcome for free.

The reverse asymmetry is worse. If the states win and the category fragments into fifty licensing regimes, ROLR cannot afford to compete. A company with 57 employees and $25 million cannot file fifty license applications, and the moat that currently protects nobody would instantly protect only the incumbents.

The Clarity Act hearing sits inside this window and it is the piece that decides which branch runs.

ROLR is a levered bet on federal preemption. That is the trade, stated plainly.

10.97 Million Shares and 57 Employees

The structural facts about this company deserve their own accounting because they determine how the stock behaves regardless of the fundamentals.

Shares outstanding: 10.97 million. Market capitalization: $57.92 million. Employees: 57. Average daily volume: 676,240 shares. Today's volume: 103,940.

A 10.97 million share count is extraordinarily tight. It means the float is a fraction of that once insiders and the January placement investors are excluded, and it means the stock gaps rather than trends. The $33.68 high and $1.16 low inside twelve months is not a fundamental range. It is a float artifact — a small number of shares repricing violently on headlines.

The 57-employee figure is the one that should give any bull pause. That headcount runs two online casino brands across multiple European jurisdictions with over 6,000 games from more than 90 providers, an internet advertising business, a public company compliance function, and a de novo regulated derivatives introducing brokerage. The company appointed a head of applied artificial intelligence specifically to handle compliance automation, personalization and customer engagement, which is the correct answer to that constraint and also an admission of it.

Average volume of 676,240 shares at $5.28 is roughly $3.6 million of daily turnover. That is enough for retail and nothing else. No institution can build a position of consequence without moving the price 20%, which is why the addition to the Russell Microcap Index on June 29 mattered — it is the only passive vehicle in the index complex that can hold this name.

The peer comparison frames it. The nearest listed comparables trade at $25.43 and $12.65 with market capitalizations orders of magnitude larger. DraftKings sits at $24.94 with a $12.17 billion cap. ROLR is not in the same asset class as its own peer group.

The company held its 2026 annual shareholder meeting on July 1. It regained compliance with NYSE American listing standards after two consecutive quarters. Those are survival milestones, not growth milestones, and they were the news flow eighteen months ago.

This is a lottery ticket with a license attached.

The August 11 Print Is the First Look at ROLR Revenue

The date that matters is three and a half weeks out and it is the first quarter that could contain prediction markets economics.

The next earnings date is August 11. The second quarter covers April through June — a window that contains the April 20 advance into U.S. prediction markets, the June 4 launch of the $25 million free-to-trade challenge, the June 26 NFA membership and guaranteed introducing broker registration, and the June 29 Russell Microcap addition.

What it does not contain is meaningful revenue. The registration landed four days before quarter-end. The free-to-trade challenge is by definition free. Whatever the ROLR brand generated between June 26 and June 30 rounds to zero.

So the print will show the casino business continuing to decay. Consensus does not exist in any meaningful sense on a name with this float, but the trajectory is knowable: first-quarter net revenues fell 35% to $3.4 million on a deliberate exit from certain markets and reduced acquisition spend, and nothing in the second quarter reversed that decision. Expect another double-digit decline against a $5 million-ish prior-year base, offset by adjusted EBITDA that improves again as the spend keeps coming out.

The numbers that will actually move the stock are not on the income statement. They are: registered ROLR users from the free-to-trade challenge, the timeline for the official product release, the mobile platform build status, and any disclosure about the take-rate structure under the guaranteed introducing broker arrangement.

Management has been disciplined about framing. The first quarter was described as transformative for balance sheet reasons rather than revenue reasons, and the company committed to reshaping around a focused, better-capitalized, high-upside growth strategy. That is honest language for a pivot, and it means August 11 will be a business update with financials attached rather than the reverse.

The stock fell 27.6% in the stretch after the last report while the broad index returned 0.1%. It has done that after each of the recent prints — the news is good and the numbers are small, and small numbers win in the short run.

Watch the user count. It is the only number that converts optionality into revenue.

The Trade: $5.15 Floor, $6.17 Cap, and a Genuine Binary

The levels are wide and the outcome is binary, which is an unusual and honest thing to say about a listed equity. ROLR trades near $5.28. Today's range runs $5.15 to $5.50 off a $5.25 open. The July 2 session traded $5.81 to $6.17 and closed $6.01 — that $6.17 print is the near-term ceiling and it is 16.9% above spot. The 52-week low at $1.16 is 78.0% down. The 52-week high at $33.68 is 538% up. The January placement price of $13.21 sits 150% overhead.

The base case is a drift on 15% of average volume into August 11. The technical read downgraded from buy to hold on small weaknesses, the modeled fair value sat at $6.00, and the stock has not seen it. There is no catalyst on the calendar between now and the print.

The bull case is a decimal point. The category is on pace to exceed $325 billion in volume this year and potentially $1.1 trillion by 2030. Capture one-tenth of one percent at a 3% take rate and that is $9.75 million of revenue against a $13.6 million annualized base — a 72% addition to the top line on a $57.92 million market cap. The NFA registration is real, the federal preemption tailwind is real, and the clearing counterparty just took a $400 million investment at a $20 billion valuation. A 10.97 million share count means any re-rating is violent.

The bear case is the wall. The leading exchange runs $10 billion in weekly notional, did $31 billion in June at 85% sports, is raising at $40 billion — 690 times ROLR's cap — and took 42.3% of World Cup app installs. DraftKings launched its own exchange into an app tens of millions of people already have. Revenue fell 35% by design and the $25 million promotional budget is the entire January raise. Adjusted EBITDA at negative $1.3 million a quarter buys runway, not share.

Watch the user disclosure on August 11 and watch $5.15. This is a $57.92 million company with 57 employees, a license granted three weeks ago, and a stock that has traded between $1.16 and $33.68 in a year. Size it accordingly.

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